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I. INTRODUCTION
Neither the claims of ownership nor those of control can stand
against the paramount interests of the community. . . . It remains
only for the claims of the community to be put forward with clarity
and force.1

This radical statement encapsulates one of the key themes of Adolf
Berle’s work: stockholders no longer had a role in the corporation that
entitled them to extensive claims in the corporation. Heralded in The
Modern Corporation, his reconceptualization of the nature of ownership
in the context of shareholding was based on empirical data on the massive level of share dispersal in America’s largest corporations.2 Stockholders had become too numerous and too dispersed to exercise control
over “their” corporation. Instead, managers—the paid employees of the
company—controlled the corporations. In this new arrangement, where
business was dominated by management-controlled organizations as opposed to owner-controlled organizations—a shift dubbed by Berle as a
“revolution”3—new guiding principles for corporations needed to be
drawn. In this new corporate order the state was required to take the lead
to achieve a morally correct balance of interests, a balance which rele-
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gated to the community both the longstanding interests of stockholders
and the new control possessed by corporate managers.4
According to Berle in The Modern Corporation, these shifts in
ownership and control meant that shareholder primacy models for the
corporation were outdated: they were based on an outdated model of
ownership and entitlement.5 Shareholder ownership claims should no
longer operate as the guiding force behind governance and corporate
goals because the nature of that ownership had changed.6 In the modern
corporation, Berle argued, stock ownership had become a “passive” arrangement that was devoid of “spiritual values” and creative input. The
owners were not able to directly employ their wealth and its value was
dependent on outside forces.7 Through such mechanisms as limited liability, the owners of stock, unlike the owners of tangible property such as
land, bore little responsibility for their property. Correspondingly, owners of stock could not demand the extensive rights generally attributed to
private property. Shareholder ownership claims were much more limited
and were subject to wider community interest. Accordingly, shareholders were entitled to maintain the liquidity of their assets, protect their
assets’ unrestricted transferability, and have clear, accurate information
on their assets’ value—indeed, most of the protections suggested by
Berle in his earlier Harvard Law Review piece.8 However, shareholders’
limited relationship and responsibility for their property correspondingly
limited their claims. In other words, Berle attributed different normative
values to different levels of ownership.
Thus, for Berle, when the large corporation separated ownership
from control, “ownership” became a smaller bundle of legal rights that
had an historical relationship with property rights but were not property
rights themselves.9 Stock property was, by its nature, more social than
private and its owners could no longer claim private property-type rights.
The normative values attributable to this level of property were small
claims to modest returns after the claims of the community, particularly
labour, had been met.

4. See J.R. Boatright, Fiduciary Duties and the Shareholder-Management Relation: Or, What’s
So Special about Shareholders?, 4 BUS. ETHICS Q. 393 (1994). This article discusses some of the
policy issues that arose from the Berle-Dodd debate.
5. Id.
6. Such sentiments have been voiced in a number of different ways. See Jane Wills, A Stake in
Place? The Geography of Employee Ownership and Its Implications for a Stakeholding Society, 23
TRANSACTIONS OF THE INST. OF BRIT. GEOGRAPHERS 79 (1998).
7. BERLE & MEANS, supra note 1, at 79.
8. See Adolf A. Berle, For Whom Corporate Managers are Trustees?, 45 HARV. L. REV. 1145
(1932).
9. BERLE & MEANS, supra note 1, at 297.
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In the United Kingdom, this radical theme in Berle’s work has been
lost. Generally, Berle is cited as an early commentator on share dispersal
and the resulting problem of director accountability. This emphasis is
particularly misleading, as it gives the impression that Berle was concerned with re-empowering shareholders to act as a bulwark against
management power and also enabling them to assert their proper claims
as owners. However, while Berle probably maintained a lifelong ambivalence to management power,10 it seems clear from his work in and after The Modern Corporation that he was not concerned with reempowering shareholders. That ship had sailed and society was the better for it. So why has British scholarship, law, and policy been so blind
to the radical theme of downgraded shareholder claims?
This paper offers some tentative suggestions as to why Berle’s
work has been read and interpreted so selectively in the United Kingdom.
I suggest that this must be partly attributable to the historical developments in English company law that entrenched the notion of shareholder
ownership claims. Specifically, unincorporated associations’ normative
values—that members are owners and there is no distinction between
small organizations with no share dispersal and large organizations with
wide share dispersal—have a continuing influence on this entrenched
notion of shareholder ownership claims. Part II will provide an overview
of the origins of English company law. Part III will address how the
Bubble Act encouraged unincorporated businesses and shareholder primacy. Part IV will discuss the influence of unincorporated business concepts in the early Companies Acts. Finally, Part V will conclude: Berle
theorized that the disconnect between shareholder and company resulted
in low shareholder entitlement and a corresponding “un-owned-ness” of
the company; he further theorized that this could be the basis for social
reforms. However, this was not the outcome in Britain. Instead, share
dispersal was not a sufficient condition for the reconceptualization of
ownership in Britain, given the strength of the legal shareholder entitlement model. A future article will build upon this thesis and will show
that this model was only challengeable given the set of wider social reforms introduced in the post-war period.
II. THE ORIGINS OF ENGLISH CORPORATE LAW: AN OVERVIEW
The rudimentary beginnings of company law can be traced to the
seventeenth century. Before that time, incorporation did not originally
designate a form that was particularly distinct from an unincorporated
10. See William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, Shareholder Primacy’s Corporatist Origins: Adolf Berle and the Modern Corporation, 34 J. CORP. L. 99 (2008).
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form.11 Business associations were merely formed through different
mechanisms, with some resulting in an incorporated association and
some resulting in an unincorporated association. Incorporation was
achieved through the grant of a charter by the crown12 or, after the English revolution, by an Act of parliament.13 Statutes were also used to extend the powers of the Royal prerogative so that they could grant charters
with enhanced privileges.14 Unincorporated associations, in contrast,
were formed through differing levels of informal understandings. However, in terms of their post-formation characteristics, there were no significant differences between the two forms.
The first corporate form existed as a nexus of contracts and bore little resemblance to corporations as we know them today. Members of
incorporated associations frequently made partnership arrangements between themselves, thus operating as unincorporated associations under
the umbrella of a body corporate. For example, medieval guilds, which
were associations of craftsmen in a particular trade, frequently sought
incorporation in order to secure a monopoly over their trade. However, a
guild’s members would then often form unincorporated associations operating within the corporate body.15 As early as the fourteenth century,
merchant traders sought charters in order to secure monopoly trading
rights. Like the medieval guilds, traders entered into agreements with
each other as unincorporated merchant trading associations operating
under the body corporate. The most famous among these charter compa-

11. Paddy Ireland et al., The Conceptual Foundations of Modern Company Law, 14 J.L. SOC’Y
1 (1987). This article indicates the lack of distinction between shares in incorporated companies and
shares in unincorporated companies during the period before the end of the nineteenth century.
12. Until the reformation, incorporation could also be conferred upon English religious bodies
by the Pope. Dewey argues that the notion of fiction in respect to corporate personality originated
with Pope Innocent IV, who sought to thwart the political power to punish ecclesiastical bodies by
conceptualizing them as fictions incapable of guilt or liabilities. See John Dewey, The Historical
Background of Corporate Legal Personality, 35 YALE L. J. 655 (1926).
13. Following the English Revolution, incorporation could also be achieved through statute;
however, this route was not popular until the end of the eighteenth century. See PAUL L. DAVIES &
L.C.B. GOWER, GOWER’S PRINCIPLES OF MODERN COMPANY LAW 19 (Sweet & Maxwell 1997).
14. It did this in the case of the Bank of England and the South Sea Company. See generally
Peter Temin & Hans-Joachim Voth, Riding the South Sea Bubble, 94 AM. ECON. REV. 5 (2004);
Julian Hoppit, The Myths of the South Sea Bubble, 12 TRANSACTIONS OF THE ROYAL HIST. SOC’Y
141 (2002); Ron Harris, The Bubble Act: Its Passage and Its Effects on Business Organization, 54 J.
ECON. HIST. 610 (1994).
15. See Harris, supra note 14. Such associations or partnerships within the guilds fell into two
identifiable forms. The first, the commenda, described an agreement where a financier of a trader
was rewarded with a share of the profits rather than an agreed interest rate—much in the way of a
sleeping partner. The latter form of partnership, societas, was akin to the modern partnership in that
it was more permanent, the liability of partners was unlimited, and each partner was agent of the
other. Id.
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nies was the East India Company.16 The East India Company began trading in 1600 with a membership comprised of both sole traders and partnerships that invested in joint stock with joint liability that terminated
upon the completion of a particular voyage.17 By 1652, permanent joint
stock was introduced, but this coexisted with private trading until 1692
when the latter practice was discontinued.18 During this period the incorporated body had an identity,19 the East India Company, but it acted
as an umbrella for a number of different commercial arrangements between persons. Thus, unlike the modern company, it really did exist as a
nexus of contracts.20
The Bubble Act of 172021 subsequently conceptualized the incorporated company as a more distinct form. However, by the time it had
done so, incorporation had already lost its popularity. In its place, the
unincorporated form dominated business. The marginalization of the
incorporated form meant that when the legislature sought to make incorporations accessible to all shades of business through the Joint Stock
Companies Registration Act of 184422 (1844 Act). The Act described
the new registered company in terms which actually described the dominant unincorporated forms: the partnership and the Deed of Settlement
Company.23 These post-Bubble Act unincorporated forms were distinguishable from the incorporated forms of this period24 in a number of key
respects. First, both the partnership and the Deed of Settlement Company were private legal arrangements between individuals. They were not,
like the companies incorporated by charters, concessions from the state

16. See C.E. Walker, The History of the Joint Stock Company, 6 ACCT. REV. 97 (1931).
17. DAVIES & GOWER, supra note 13, at ch. 1.
18. Id.
19. See Murray A. Pickering, The Company as a Separate Entity, 31 MOD. L. REV. 481 (1968).
20. It is interesting to note that Jensen and Meckling’s new concept of the corporation as just a
“nexus of contracts” is radically out of date—it describes arrangements which ceased to exist by the
nineteenth century. See Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, The Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs, and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON 305 (1976); see also Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Conception that the Corporation is a Nexus of Contracts, and the Dual Nature
of the Firm, 24 J. CORP. L. 819 (1999).
21. This Act was originally known as the Royal Exchange and London Assurance Corporation
Act of 1719. The Act’s full title is “An Act for better securing certain Powers and Privileges, intended to be granted by His Majesty by Two Charters, for Assurance of Ships and Merchandize at
Sea, and for lending Money upon Bottomry; and for restraining several extravagant and unwarrantable Practices therein mentioned.” Frank Evans, The Evolution of the English Joint Stock Limited
Trading Company, 8 COL. L. REV. 339, 353 (1908) (quoting 6 Geo. 1, c. 18 (Eng.)).
22. 7 & 8 Vict., c. 109, 110 (Eng.).
23. See Geoffrey Todd, Some Aspects of Joint Stock Companies, 1844–1900, 4 ECON. HIST.
REV. 46 (1932).
24. These incorporated forms differed from the new form of incorporation, which emerged in
the end of the nineteenth century.
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with all of those implied public responsibilities.25 Second, they
represented the property interests of the members who had contracted for
self-interested commercial motives only. Furthermore, and in contrast to
members of the later nineteenth-century incorporated forms,26 members
of these types of unincorporated forms were owners of the whole undertaking and thus had the expectations, responsibilities, and claims of private property owners.27
III. CORPORATE LAW, THE SOUTH SEA COMPANY, AND THE BUBBLE
ACT
By the late seventeenth century, permanent joint stock, exchanging
in an active market as a liquid asset, was beginning to emerge.28 This
type of stock was much more akin to our modern company share, and
such a development might have heralded modern English company law
were it not for the activities of the South Sea Company, a charter company that traded in South America during the 1700s. The South Sea Company’s collapse at the end of 1720 and the catastrophic speculative bubble it inflated led to the large-scale abandonment of the incorporated
form by businessmen and the contraction of the stock market.29 At the
same time, parliament passed a number of acts to regulate and limit the
market in shares, including the Bubble Act.30 Because of the events following the collapse of the South Sea Company, it was not until the nineteenth century that business regained its interest in the stock market.31
A. The South Sea Company
The South Sea Company’s scheme to buy government debt was approved by Parliament in April 1720. One of the key aspects of this
scheme involved persuading the holders of government bonds and de25. For a full discussion of the Concession Theory, see J.E. PARKINSON, CORPORATE POWER
RESPONSIBILITY (Oxford University Press 1993); see generally William W. Bratton, Jr., The
New Economic Theory of the Firm: Critical Perspectives from History, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1471
(1989); David Millon, Theories of the Corporation, 1990 DUKE L.J. 201 (1990).
26. In modern corporate law, the company has a separate legal personality and shares of stock
are titles to revenue, not claims to the whole undertaking.
27. L.C.B. Gower, The English Private Company, 84 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 535 (1953).
28. 2 WILLIAM ROBERT SCOTT, THE CONSTITUTION AND FINANCE OF ENGLISH, SCOTTISH AND
IRISH JOINT STOCK COMPANIES TO 1720 (1910).
29. See A. B. DUBOIS, THE ENGLISH BUSINESS COMPANY AFTER THE BUBBLE ACT 1720–1800
(Commonwealth Fund 1938).
30. The most significant of these acts were passed in 1734, 7 Geo. 2, c. 8, and in 1737, 10 Geo.
2, c.8. However, a number of acts had been passed in 1697 and 1708, prior to the Bubble Act. 8 &
9 Will. 3, c. 32 (Eng.); 6 Ann., c. 68 (Eng.).
31. See R. C. MICHIE, THE LONDON STOCK EXCHANGE: A HISTORY (Oxford Univ. Press
1999).
AND
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bentures to exchange them for South Sea Company shares.32 In order to
persuade bond holders that these shares were highly valuable commodities, the directors needed to push up the share price. And, as the company did no real trade, this could only be achieved by legal device, hype,
and extravagant claims designed to create demand.33 The South Sea
Company set up an imaginative financial scheme which appeared to
create money out of nothing. It funded dividends from new issues and
offered interest-free loans to buy shares. Through these and other strategies, the company hoped to circulate investors’ money profitably and
indefinitely.34 The speculative nature of this activity in which nothing of
value was being created meant that share price represented shareholders’
demand only. That demand was based on the shareholders’ belief that
the company was making real value, although that belief was utterly
misguided. When shareholder belief in share value vastly exceeds real
value because of, for example, successful hype, share prices are known
as “bubbles.” Bubbles are an apt metaphor because bubbles are delicate
and they have little substance for the space that they fill—and when the
air that puffs them up eventually stretches their material reality/fabric too
much, they will burst.
The success of the South Sea Company spawned a general clamor
to buy shares in other companies and unincorporated associations that
had equally dubious business purposes.35 The other companies’ inflated
stock prices created “mini-bubbles” that threatened the South Sea Company’s bubble and profits. As a result, the directors and those involved
in the South Sea Company sought government intervention.
B. The Bubble Act and Its Effects
In response to the South Sea Company’s pleas for help, the government passed the hastily-drafted Bubble Act, which prohibited the sale
of freely transferable shares by associations operating without a charter.36
The South Sea Company hoped that the more restricted availability of

32. See MALCOLM BALEN, A VERY ENGLISH DECEIT: THE SECRET HISTORY OF THE SOUTH
SEA BUBBLE AND THE FIRST GREAT FINANCIAL SCANDAL (Fourth Estate Ltd. 2003).
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. See generally Ron Harris, Political Economy, Interest Groups, Legal Institutions, and the
Repeal of the Bubble Act in 1825, 50 ECON. HIST. REV. 675 (1997).
36. See Bubble Act, supra note 21. The Act prohibited the raising of freely transferable stock
without a charter, an emphasis which allowed the later growth of organizations that had some restriction on the transferability of stock. Id.
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shares in the market would further enhance the value of the company’s
shares.37
Instead, the Bubble Act had a very different effect. The fearsome
tone of the legislation undermined public confidence in share trading per
se.38 So even though the Act gave a temporary boost to the South Sea
Company, after just a few more months of trading, the company’s share
price collapsed, and with it, the national economy.39 As a result of this
financial catastrophe, the Bubble Act—conceived as a short-term device—stayed on the statute books for one hundred and five years. That
was the first unintended consequence of the Bubble Act.40
The second unintended effect of the Act was to conceptually sever
the unincorporated association from the incorporated company.41 As
previously noted, the legal distinction between incorporated and unincorporated associations had not been clearly defined. Partnerships
formed and confirmed under seal could provide for the division of interests into shares whose transferability was determined according to the
terms of the partnership agreement. Many of the joint stock “companies”
selling shares and contributing to the financial bubble were in fact unincorporated associations. This, of course, accounted for the prohibition
against unincorporated companies in the Bubble Act.42
The third unintended effect was to enhance the role of unincorporated associations in the emerging English capitalist economy.43 After
the financial collapse exacerbated by the Bubble Act, the English gov37. There are a number of different perspectives on the passage of the Bubble Act. Some
commentators have mistakenly identified its passage as a reaction to the collapse of the South Sea
Company. See SIR WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 117 (Univ.
of Chicago Press 1979) (1765). These comments have had a huge impact on thinking about this
issue. Scott views it as a more general attempt to control speculation in shares. See SCOTT, supra
note 28. More recently, the Act has been discussed as a mechanism for legislatures to achieve higher rents by enhancing charter use, similar to legislative rent seeking in the nineteenth century America. See Henry N. Butler, General Incorporation in Nineteenth Century England: Interaction of
Common Law and Legislative Processes, 6 INT’L REV. L. & ECON 169 (1986). This article does not
attempt to assess these perspectives; instead, it follows the more generally accepted and historically
verifiable line that the Act was concocted by Parliament to protect the South Sea Company.
38. See Harris, supra note 14. Harris argues that because the Act was passed on June 11th—
and South Sea Company shares peaked on June 24th before sliding in August and collapsing in
September—the Act itself cannot be blamed for the company’s collapse. However, while it certainly
was true that the company’s failure was, at its core, due to the speculative nature of the scheme
itself, the rapid decline after the Act cannot discount it is as being contributory to its speed of collapse. Id.
39. See generally Harris, supra note 14; see also DUBOIS, supra note 29.
40. Margaret Patterson & David Reiffen, The Effect of the Bubble Act on the Market for Joint
Stock Shares, 50 J. ECON. HIST. 163 (1990).
41. See DUBOIS, supra note 29.
42. See Harris, supra note 14.
43. See DUBOIS, supra note 29.
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ernment’s shock and embarrassment made it generally averse to granting
charters of incorporation.44 The raising of joint stock had been described
in the Act as “dangerous and mischievous to trade,” and the ensuing financial collapse of the South Sea Company seemed to evidence the truth
of that statement.45 Companies with freely transferable shares were
treated with suspicion by the public and by the government alike, and
unincorporated associations became the preferred choice for business.46
The uneasiness about how to apply the Bubble Act had one final unintended consequence: it created the company lawyer.47 Businesses increasingly sought legal advice on the Act’s applicability to their business
and relied on lawyers to draft Bubble Act-compliant business structures.48 As such, businesses became dependent on lawyers, who in turn
developed their skills as business organization lawyers. In the BubbleAct era, businesses increasingly called upon lawyers to construct complicated forms of unincorporated business organizations that could perform
most of the desirable functions of incorporated bodies while remaining
Bubble-Act compliant. The Deed of Settlement Company successfully
performed this function.49 Here, a company would be formed under a
deed of settlement whereby the subscribers agreed to be associated with
the company and held shares in accordance with the terms of the deed.50
The property of the company was held by a body of trustees. Simple
partnerships remained popular for small and medium-sized businesses
and the common law honed partnership law as a result. Paradoxically, an
Act that was designed to suppress the use of unincorporated business
associations resulted in encouraging their proliferation:
The Bubble Act had decreed a “new deal” for organized business,
but the moral tone of the eighteenth century was not sufficiently advanced to appreciate the benefits of the new dispensation. In consequence, entrepreneurs and their legal advisors turned to the device

44. Id.
45. See Bubble Act, supra note 21. In contrast to Parliament, the English judiciary was more
sympathetic to those trading in shares. The first prosecution was in 1808 and it was unsuccessful.
Rex v. Dodd, 9 East 527.
46. See Bishop C. Hunt, The Joint-Stock Company in England, 1830–1844, 43 J. POL. ECON.
331 (1935). Hunt examines the deep-set anxiety felt by British businesses regarding the corporate
form in the early nineteenth century. However, as DuBois points out, the judiciary became more
flexible in their approach to the Bubble Act after some years. See DUBOIS, supra note 29.
47. See DUBOIS, supra note 29.
48. Id.
49. See RONALD RALPH FORMOY, THE HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF MODERN COMPANY
LAW (Sweet & Maxwell 1923).
50. Id.; see generally BISHOP C. HUNT, THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE BUSINESS CORPORATION IN
ENGLAND, 1800–1867 (Harvard Univ. Press 1936).
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of the unincorporated association to affect their ends, and in this
they were remarkably successful.51

C. Post-Bubble Act Unincorporated Businesses: The Reason for
Enduring Shareholder Primacy
In the Bubble Act era, businesses generally operated as unincorporated associations.52 Although businesses could be incorporated by an
Act of parliament or through a charter grant, incorporation was only used
for prestigious or quasi-public activities. The generalized use of unincorporated forms in the eighteenth and nineteenth century, coupled with
the early tendency to merge these forms with incorporated forms, explains to a significant degree the enduring power of the shareholder primacy model in the United Kingdom today.53
As the legal norms relating to unincorporated associations began to
merge with those of incorporated associations, the legal concepts that
distinguished the two forms began to blur together. Historically, this
developed through a number of points of contact between unincorporated
and incorporated associations. For example, unincorporated associations’ ownership norms simply continued as incorporated business’s
norms, even though this was a time when the two forms should have logically developed a new set of norms.
First, as noted earlier, prior to the Bubble Act, members of incorporated companies also operated as partners inter se. Partners were understood in common law to be co-owners of the partnership’s property, to be
jointly and severally liable for the partnership’s debts, and to have a prima facie equal claim to profits and to operational control.54 For example,
members of guild charter companies and early merchant trading associations often operated as both members of an incorporated company and as
partners inter se. Thus, incorporated associations were frequently operating as a holding body for many unincorporated associations. Additionally, before the Bubble Act, nearly all joint stock companies were unincorporated. Thus, companies had a long-standing tradition of owners who
shared the characteristics of partners in the emerging law on partnerships. Unincorporated and incorporated associations were called “companies” and these business forms organized in an interconnecting fashion.

51. See DUBOIS, supra note 29, at 216.
52. See Harris, supra note 14.
53. See D. Gordon Smith, The Shareholder Primacy Norm, 23 J. CORP. L. 277 (1998).
54. These principles are now consolidated in statute form and remain in force today. Partnership Act, 1890, 53 & 54 Vict. (Eng.).
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Second, both before and after the Bubble Act, joint stock companies were associations of people bound together by joint liability and
joint ownership regardless of whether they were incorporated or unincorporated.55 Under common law, members of all companies, incorporated and unincorporated, were conceived as beneficiaries of the company’s property.56 According to Harvard academic Samuel Williston,
shareholders had an equitable interest in both the company’s tangible
assets and profits.57 Each share, therefore, was an equitable claim to the
company’s property: “the corporation held its assets as a trustee for the
shareholders, who were in equity co-owners.”58 In respect to shareholder
liability for company debts, Williston also showed that unless there were
very specific reasons not to do so, shareholders were connected (in equity) to the obligations which the corporation owed to the outside world.59
This obligation was treated in law as part of a company’s assets and
could be enforced through equity.60
The significance of the common law rule on a member’s liability
for a company’s debts is that it indicates a common understanding that
the company and the members had a property interest in the same assets
(and therefore similar liabilities) if those assets became deficits, regardless of incorporation. The common law rules established in English
courts continued to be applied in America as late as 1826,61 which indicates how persistent the notion of conjoined shareholder and company
property interests really was. In England, the separation of the share55. See Harris, supra note 14.
56. Id.
57. See Samuel Williston, History of the Law of Business Corporations Before 1800, 2 HARV.
L. REV. 105–124, 149–166 (1888).
58. Id. at 150. Furthermore, in cases involving the Statutes of Mortmain and Frauds and transfers involving real estate, which hinged on whether property interest in the shares of stock was realty
or personalty, Williston found that the nature of the share depended on the nature of the corporate
property. Id. Thus, he concluded, “if the shareholders have in equity the same interest which the
corporation has at law, a share will be real estate or personalty, according as the corporate property
is real or personal.” Id. In respect to a fraudulent or mistaken transfer of shares, the acquisition by a
bona fide purchaser for value was protected precisely because shareholders were not legal but equitable owners. Id. A transfer made without the knowledge of the original shareholders entitled only
them to relief. Id. Williston also cites a case involving the shares of the New River Water Company, where the court held that the shares were realty because the company assets were real estate. See
L.E. TALBOT, CRITICAL COMPANY LAW, ch. 2 (Routledge-Cavendish 2007).
59. Williston, supra note 57, at 150.
60. See Salmon v. The Hamborough Co. (1691) 1 Ch. 204 (U.K.). Likewise, in a 1673 case,
the judge stated:
[I]f losses must fall upon the creditors, such losses should be borne by those who were
members of the company, who best knew their estates and credit, and not by strangers
who were drawn in to trust the company upon the credit and countenance it had from
such particular members.
Williston, supra note 57, at 162 (citing Naylor v. Brown, Finch, 83 (1673)).
61. Williston, supra note 57, at 162.
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holder from the company’s liability was achieved legislatively so that
there was a specific intention to differentiate an incorporated company
from an unincorporated association in this respect.62 The common law
position did not prima facie distinguish the liability of a member of an
incorporated company from those of an unincorporated association.
Thus, before the Bubble Act, all companies adhered to the normative values of unincorporated associations, regardless of size and method
of legal formation. The Bubble Act conceptually served those companies that were incorporated and could therefore sell freely transferable
shares, and it thus differentiated incorporated forms from those that were
not. However, because business rejected the incorporated form as a result of this Act, the normative values that existed for both forms before
the Act continued to dominate. This had huge consequences when the
legislatures drafted the first Company Registration Acts, which were
modelled after the dominant unincorporated forms.
IV. THE COMPANY REGISTRATION ACTS AND UNINCORPORATED
NORMS
A. Company Registration Acts: Blurring the Lines Between
Unincorporated and Incorporated Companies
The Bubble Act was repealed in 1825. Later, the 1844 Act was introduced to facilitate incorporation through registration, thus potentially
removing incorporation from the margins of business.63 The 1844 Act
provides more evidence of the extent that the ownership norms in unincorporated associations, particularly partnerships, continued to infect
incorporated forms.64 The legislation described members in partnership
terms and described the company constitution in terms which reflected
Deed of Settlement Companies—in other words, the legislation applied
unincorporated norms to incorporated associations. The company constitution (the memorandum and articles of association) was said to bind
each member as if it was “signed and sealed by each member.”65 Members retained full liability for obligations incurred through the company’s

62. Limited Liability Act, 1855, 18 & 19 Vict., c. 133 (Eng.). Indeed, even today, a company’s
constitution must state the limitations of its member’s liability. Companies Act, 2006, c. 46 §
9(2)(c) (Eng.) [hereinafter Companies Act 2006].
63. Supra note 22. See M. S. Rix, Company Law: 1844 and To-Day, 55 ECON. J. 242 (1945).
64. See HUNT, supra note 50.
65. The seal is significant because it was a continuation of the practices of Deed of Settlement
companies and unincorporated associations. Indeed, the constitution continued to be termed as if it
was a deed until the Companies Act 2006.
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activities,66 as in partnerships. Just as partners are liable for a company’s
debts, under the 1844 Act, members could also be compelled to pay “the
full payment of all the Debts and Liabilities of such Company or Body,
and of the Costs of Winding up and finally settling the Affairs of such
Company or Body.”67 Finally, the Act explicitly implied that companies
registered under the Act were in fact partnerships by providing that they
may do such activities as “other Partnerships.”68
The use of unincorporated association norms in the 1844 Act is unsurprising given the wider historical context in which the Act was
passed. The dispersed share ownership in incorporated companies—
which led Berle to question the nature and claims of shareholders—had
not yet occurred. Therefore, there was no reason to discontinue the conceptual merging of incorporated and unincorporated forms any more than
the Bubble Act had already done. In this period, business was closely
held and both ownership and control echoed that of an unincorporated
form. For example, the shares in these newly incorporated companies
were often held in large, oddly-sized values that were not easily transferable and functioned similar to a partnership stake. Thus, owners of
shares generally owned a large portion of the business and therefore exercised a high degree of managerial control.69 This meant that the businesses newly incorporated under the 1844 Act were much more closely
akin to partnerships than to the modern company in terms of legal form,
judicial understanding of share ownership, ownership patterns, and management.70 Indeed, aside from perpetual succession and the ability to sue
and be sued as an individual, they were quite unlike modern companies.
They were closely held organizations without any of the characteristics
of Berle’s management-controlled organization, which was characterized
by limited liability, outside ownership, non-shareholding management,
and shares (titles to revenue exchanging on an active share market).
Furthermore, although the Limited Liability Act 185571 (consolidated into the Companies Act 1862) might have enhanced outsider ownership, it actually had the effect of bringing more quasi-partnership arrangements under the incorporated umbrella. Because of the connection

66. Specifically, “any judgement, Decree, or Order for the payment of Money.” The Joint
Stock Companies Registration and Regulation Act, 1844, 7 & 8 Vict. c. 110, § 25 (Eng.).
67. Id. at § 20.
68. Id. at § 25; see also Hunt, supra note 46.
69. This was not the case for the railroad or banking industries, where incorporation was
achieved by charter or by a private act.
70. Supra note 22. See Paddy Ireland, Company Law and the Myth of Shareholder Ownership,
62 MOD. L. REV. 32 (1999); see also Gower, supra note 27.
71. The Act allowed members to limit their liability to the value of their fully paid shares.
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between limited liability72 and unethical business practices, larger, established businesses had eschewed its use.73 Conversely, limited liability
became an attractive option for small businesses74 (and even, famously,
one man companies) where outsider ownership was not a feature.75 This
option was attractive because English law, unlike much of continental
Europe and the United States, did not provide for limited partnerships.76
The Limited Partnership Act 1907 was comparatively late in coming and
only provided for limited liability for inactive investing partners. Thus,
when incorporation and limited liability through general Acts became
popular in the last quarter of the nineteenth century, it was frequently
used by people whose only access to limited liability was through incorporation but who in economic terms were either one man companies or
small partnerships.77
B. Partnership Norms and Share Ownership
The continued use of the partnership norm in companies of different sizes and levels of share dispersal has impacted the legal understanding of the nature of share ownership in England. There are many tens of
thousands of companies which are so small that they are described as
quasi-partnerships because ownership and control is retained by the same
people. However, because English common law does not prima facie
distinguish large companies from small companies, the small companies
have not been sufficiently conceptually severed from large Berlesian
companies, particularly in respect to notions of ownership. Take, for
example, the classic case of Salomon v. Salomon Co. Ltd. where an (essentially) single shareholder, who was also the only employee, sought to
avoid personal liability for the company’s debts on the basis that it was a
72. See generally LIMITED LIABILITY AND THE CORPORATION (Tony Orhnial ed., Routledge
Kegan & Paul 1982); Amalia D. Kessler, Limited Liability in Context: Lessons from the French
Origins of the American Limited Partnership, 32 J. LEGAL STUD. 511 (2003); see also Walker, supra
note 16.
73. See H. A. Shannon, The First Five Thousand Limited Liability Companies and Their Duration, 4 J. ECON. HIST. 290 (1932). Shannon notes that the Limited Liability Act was dubbed “The
Rogues Charter.” Id. The response to limited liability can be considered yet another unforeseen
consequence of the Bubble Act.
74. See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Limited Liability and the Corporation, 52
U. CHI. L. REV. 89 (1985).
75. As Williston notes, although limited liability had been recognised as early as the late seventeenth century in cases like Salmon v. The Hamborough Co., (1691) 1 Ch. 204 (U.K.), this was
mainly to protect the company from the member’s creditors, and did not protect members from the
company’s debt because of the company’s ongoing right to make levitations or calls for payments
from its members. See Williston, supra note 57.
76. See Francis M. Burdick, Limited Partnership in America and England, 6 MICH. L. REV.
525 (1908).
77. See Shannon, supra note 73.
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distinct legal person from himself. When the Court of Appeal rejected
the separate corporate personality of Salomon Co. Ltd. because “the legislature never contemplated an extension of limited liability to sole traders or to a fewer number than seven,”78 the House of Lords was quick to
point out the fallacy of this position. Instead of distinguishing between
large and small companies, the House of Lords pointed out that the number of subscribers and their involvement with the company was irrelevant
because none of these members would be liable for the company’s debts
in a limited liability company.79 Because a company was an entity (absent fraudulent registration) regardless of the number of members, vast
areas of doctrinal company law have developed that are legally applicable to all companies, but which are only practically applicable to small
companies. There are partnership norms that apply to all companies, but
these norms are only relevant when a company’s activity is posited on
relationships of mutual trust.80 Petitions on the basis of unfairly prejudicial conduct, for example, depend on some identifiable relationship between members of the company which are “partnership–like.”81 Furthermore, statutory mechanisms to regulate the fiduciary duties of shareholders or to protect minorities invariably apply to small quasipartnership companies only.82
This means that much English company law doctrine encapsulates
the notion of a participating shareholder, for whom ongoing relationships
between other members is crucial to the running of the business and who
maintains a close tie to the company’s management and assets.83 In
short, it equates shareholders in a company to partners in a partnership—
78. Salomon v. Broderip, (1895) 2 Ch. 323 (U.K.).
79. Id.; see also Bernard F. Cataldo, Limited Liability with One-Man Companies and Subsidiary Corporations, 18 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 473 (1953).
80. See Ross Grantham, The Doctrinal Basis of the Rights of Company Shareholders, 57
CAMBRIDGE L.J. 554 (1998).
81. See Companies Act 2006, supra note 62, at § 994.
82. Companies Act, 2008, c. 46 § 994. See Bruce v. Carpenter [2006] EWHC 3301 (Ch.);
Hawkes v. Cuddy [2007] EWHC 2999, [2008] B.C.C. 390 (Ch.). The Law Commission’s empirical
research indicated that the more common remedy sought by minority shareholders was for unfairly
prejudicial conduct under §§ 459–61. Furthermore, research indicated that this remedy was almost
exclusively sought by shareholders in very small companies. Of the court files relating to § 459,
petitions presented to the Companies Court between January 1994 and December 1996, 233 out of
254 were inspected. Of these, 70.4% of the petitioners were minority shareholders and 96.6% involved private companies. Nearly 34% of petitions involved companies with only two shareholders
and 48.1% of petitions involved companies with less than five shareholders. Only 4.3% of petitions
involved companies with more than ten shareholders. THE LAW COMMISSION, SHAREHOLDER
REMEDIES, (1997), No. 246 at 177–78.
83. Courts concerned with the statutory contract that exists between company and member
occasionally held that a contract exists between shareholders inter se. Rayfield v. Hands [1960] Ch.
1; Hickman v. Romney Marsh Sheepbreeder’s Ass’n [1915] 1 Ch. 881. However, in all such cases
the company was a small, closely held organization. Ebrahimi v. Westbourne Ltd. [1973] A.C. 360.
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this is the type of arrangement present in the facts of these cases and the
quasi-partnership conception of small companies infects the notions of
companies per se. In the early period of company law history, the legal
conception of shareholders as partners or quasi-partners bore a reasonable relationship to prevalent business practice. However, as shares became more widely dispersed, such conceptions of shareholders should, as
Berle argued, have been radically reformulated.84 In English law they
were not.
This takes us to a curious aspect in the development of English corporate law. Companies in which shareholding was more dispersed were
developing contemporaneously with quasi-partnership companies, but
the property nature of shares was reconceptualized in widely-held companies. Unlike partnerships, widely-held companies conceptualized their
shares as personal property. The modern view of the share as personal
property was established in Bligh v. Brent.85 In that case, the plaintiff’s
assertion that the interest of the cestui que trust was co-extensive with
the legal interest of the trustee was entirely in line with previous authorities.86 Shareholders were equitable owners of the whole undertaking.
Therefore if the company’s assets were real estate, the shares were realty;
if the assets were not real estate, the shares were personalty. However,
the court held the shares in the company to be personalty rather than realty, regardless of the company’s assets.87 In judgement, Baron Alderton
stated that shareholders had no claim on the assets—shareholders only
had claim to the surplus that those assets produced. He conceptualized
assets and profits achieved with assets into two different forms of property: the company owned the former, and the shareholder owned the latter.
Thus, in the larger companies, shares were understood as a property distinct from those interests and claims held by partners. Shareholders’ interest was becoming a tradable bundle of claims which were detached
from company assets.88
Yet despite the reconceptualization of the property nature of shareholders’ assets, in England it was not accompanied by a reconceptualiza84. See BERLE & MEANS, supra note 1.
85. Bligh v Brent, (1836) 2 Y. & C. 268. This case in fact involved a charter company with
mainly personalty assets. For an assessment of the implications of this for Williston’s analysis of the
importance of this case, see TALBOT, supra note 58.
86. Williston supra note 57, at 149.
87. Under the terms of a will, whether shares were personalty or realty determined who could
inherit them.
88. See Ireland et al., supra note 11. The authors here noted that Alderton’s view had extended
to all companies by the 1850s and cite to Sir John Romilly in Poole v. Middleton, 29 Beav. 646
(1861), who stated that shares in joint stock companies were effectively independent property. The
authors also refer to Bacon, who stated that shares were no longer personal actionable rights, but
were instead “freehold property.” Ireland, et al., supra note 11, at 159.
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tion of the nature of shareholder’s claims and entitlement. Shareholders
were still conceived as owners with the entitlement of owners, which
seems to be more extensive than mere ownership of shares.89 And, while
in modern corporate law it is fully accepted that shareholders do not own
the company assets, company doctrine still maintains the seemingly paradoxical position that shareholders are the owners even though they
have no insurable interest in the company.90
Companies in the United Kingdom may be either small quasipartnership companies with no outside share dispersal or large Berlesian
organizations with a separation between ownership and control. However, the historical development of company law—specifically in the early
Company Registration Acts and the continued use of partnership-like
legal concepts in company law—has meant that large companies have
not been conceptually severed from partnership-like companies. Thus,
company law continues to characterize shareholders in all companies as
owners.
V. CONCLUSION: BERLE AND THE NORMATIVE IMPLICATIONS OF
PROPERTY OWNERSHIP
In the United Kingdom, shareholders continue to be considered the
owners of companies and the proper recipients of corporate activity, regardless of the level of share dispersal. This, I have shown, is partly because of the historical development of company law: the interconnectedness of incorporated and unincorporated associations prior to the Bubble
Act, followed by the dominance of unincorporated forms in the postBubble Act period, resulted in the legal internalization of normative values into company law that more properly belong to unincorporated associations. This continued even after the law itself had reconceptualized
the property rights of shareholders so that they were no longer equitable
owners of the whole undertaking. Shareholder primacy further developed when the Company Registration Acts introduced incorporation
through registration and later allowed members to limit their liability. In
the former case, this was because these Acts continued to describe companies in partnership terms, with corresponding implications for ownership; in the latter case, this was because the Acts encouraged small part89. See Ireland, supra note 70. Ireland argues that the reasons for the continuous conception of
shareholders as owners can be found in the conflict between church and economy over the usury
laws. Id.
90. Macaura v. Northern Assurance Co. Ltd. [1925] A.C. 619. Insurable interest is a key
attribute of owning property. See generally O. Kahn-Freund, Some Reflections on Company Law
Reform, 7 MOD. L. REV. 54 (1944).
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nership-like businesses to become incorporated companies, thus putting
partnership-like disputes in the common law and legislation developing
for companies.
Following Berle’s thesis, this should have changed with the rise of
dispersed shareholding, but it did not. For Berle, the changing nature of
shareholding—severed from assets, personal involvement, and liability—
has certain normative implications. In illustrating what his normative
understanding of property ownership is and the nature of shareholding in
the new setting of large corporations, Berle approvingly quoted German
minister Walter Rathenau:
No one is a permanent owner. The composition of the thousand
fold complex which functions as lord of the undertaking is in a state
of flux. . . . This condition of things signifies that ownership has
been depersonalized . . . the depersonalization of ownership simultaneously implies the objectification of the thing owned. The
claims to ownership are subdivided in such a fashion, and are so
mobile, that the enterprise assumes an independent life, as if it belonged to no one; it takes an objective existence.91

Rathenau clearly indicated, as Berle himself maintained, that the
shift in the nature of shares—now depersonalized as freely transferable
intangible assets—has created a corresponding shift in the nature of the
company itself. Now the company “takes an objective existence;” it has
an “un-owned-ness” which has implications for future understandings of
the claims of shareholders. The disassociation of shareholders’ claims in
the company—already understood as distinct from company assets and
known as the doctrine of separate legal personality—freed the company
from any overriding obligation to its shareholders. This “un-ownedness” opened opportunities for the company to operate in a socially responsible fashion.
But, as the evolution of English companies indicates, the lack of
“owned-ness” does not necessarily result in corporate social responsibility and a shift away from shareholder primacy. Indeed, recent company
legislation has put directors under a statutory duty to promote the interests of shareholders.92 The British conception of shareholder primacy, so
influenced by the normative values of the unincorporated associations
from which company law emerged, is vastly different than what Berle
predicted corporations would be like and how he envisioned the nature of
ownership. This is partly because share dispersal was not as complete in
England as it was in the United States at the time of The Modern Corpo91. See BERLE & MEANS, supra note 1.
92. Companies Act 2006, supra note 62, at § 172.
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ration. But it is principally because the notion of shareholders as owners
(thus deserving primary consideration as an entitlement of that ownership) was too grounded in law, and the historical development of that
law, to be shifted by such trifling things as the emergence of wide share
dispersal. Berle’s new ownership required wider social reform so that it
could take root. As I will discuss in a future publication, this was partly
managed in the context of Britain’s shift to corporatism in the post-war
period. It is possible that shareholding in widely-held organizations
could shift away from the notions of entitlement which underpinned
shareholder primacy in the United Kingdom; however, this could only
happen in the context of radical reform in ideology, politics, and government policy.

